The market is treating it as if future growth is unclear, but its not because the business is sitting in a tailwind created by the expansion of capacity of RAM memory by SK Hynix, Samsung, and Micron.

-Second-order beneficiary of the RAM shortage.

-Growing topline revenue at double digits.

-Two segments growing at 30%+ annually with customers like Meta, and now recently Google. A subsegment expected to double shipments this year.

-6% dividend yield.

-It trades at low multiples. PE 12~ (Below its historical average).

-Its biggest revenue segment is currently supressed, partly due to a slowdown in the sale of laptops- because of the rise of memory prices, not an actual demand destruction of laptops.

-The business itself is also evolving to one with more of a qualification moat.

As the other segments experience 30% and double digit growth you get a more diversified company- and when their biggest segment bounces back eventually you will most likely have growth from every product.

This is not a moonshot. And its Moat is not impenetrable, but it’s an undervalued company based on three factors:

1- Future Growth in memory will clearly benefit them.

2- Growth is deviating towards higher-margin segments.

3- Valuation is below historical mean, and this doesn’t take into account point 1 and 2.

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Soitec

Soitec caught my eye after reading Jason’s article.

This strapping young lad (Jason) is doing some great research, I suggest you read his article before you continue with mine.

Jason's Chips

The Soitec Series | Part (1/7): Introduction to the French Photonics Substrate Monopoly

Opinions are my own and do not represent past, present, and/or future employers. All content is based on public information and independent research. This newsletter is not financial advice, and readers should always do their own research before investing in any security. I am invested in the semiconductor industry. As of the date of this publication, I…

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2 months ago · 47 likes · 8 comments · Jason's Chips

As a generalist, I want to understand Soitec’s operating leverage, bottleneck potential, moat, and valuation.

I do not have a specialist know-how, but I have relied on my fundamental knowledge of companies to make money.

Before we can even get to valuation, we need to understand a few things, quite briefly:

1- What Soitec actually makes?

2- Is there a moat, is it hard to make?

3- Is there operating leverage? If there is enough demand, can they pump them out and capatilize on that with economies of scale?

4- Roughly, what will the demand for SOI wafers be in future

Once we know this we can get to

5. Valuation- and how that relates to how fast the company will grow.

Fortuantely, Jason already answers most of our questions in his article.

I finished reading his article and thought- “I need to understand the nitty gritties of the valuation, how many of these SOI wafers the market will demand (roughly) and whether that leads to a blast off in operating leverage”.

I look forward to reading his parts 2-7, but I’m too impatient and I want to undrestand this business more thoroughly, right now.

Jason's Chips

The Soitec Series | Part (1/7): Introduction to the French Photonics Substrate Monopoly

Opinions are my own and do not represent past, present, and/or future employers. All content is based on public information and independent research. This newsletter is not financial advice, and readers should always do their own research before investing in any security. I am invested in the semiconductor industry. As of the date of this publication, I…

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2 months ago · 47 likes · 8 comments · Jason's Chips

I’m going to recap a bit, because as a generalist I still needed to wrap my head around what this company actually does.

1- What Soitec actually makes?

We’ve got a Soitec SOI wafer on the left, and normal wafer on the right.

Companies we’ve spoken about- like Shin Etsu, and RS Technologies, (and there are tons of others), make wafers. RS Technologies makes the wafers on the right. Shin Etsu makes both. Soitec makes the ones on the left.

The big risk to our ‘normal’ silicon wafer companies is that everyone now knows how to make them. China is increasing capacity a lot.

When it comes to SOI wafers, Soitec has a special process- its Smart Cut Technology. It actually licenses this out to Shin-Etsu Handotai (owned by Shin Etsu). So great! Shin Etsu also makes photonics wafers! We are positioned well! (But probably a small % of revenue…for now…).

Back to Soitec- they ALSO manufacture these SOI wafers themselves.

2- Is there a moat, is it hard to make?

Jason has described the moat quite nicely.

Smart Cut™ - This is the foundational enabling technology for engineered SOI substrates and Soitec says it underpins nearly all SOI wafers sold globally.

The moat exists.

3- Is there operating leverage?

There is. Via its own manufacturing capacity for SOI wafers and also via its royalty stream.

And what is even better is that the licenses are royalty based- so Soitec will benefit from any increase in demand for SOI wafers. This means if there is a ramp up (which is coming next year and beyond), Soitec will get close to pure profits from Shin Etsu, and other companies that hold Soitec Smart Cut licenses.

That is pure operating leverage if you ask me.

The company also has operating leverage in the form of its own manufacturing capacity.

The company has publicly disclosed their capacity too, on their site.

It’s very likely that Soitec can rellocate their mix within the SOI lines, I’m just assuming this because BERNIN 2 for instance says that they can produce multiple SOI types.

But the royalty revenue will impact the bottom-line (net profit) directly, and that is pure operating leverage without the risk of expanding capacity.

Pure profit play.

Which means any potential bottleneck that leads to a price hike would also be captured via the royalty stream.

From Soitec’s filings: in FY2024-2025, Soitec reported €891 million of consolidated revenue, and its customer mix table shows “Other customers/royalties” = 13% of revenue.

We don’t know how much of “Other” is purely royalties. But 13% isn’t small, especially when it comes with almost 0 cost. Also, most of the end markets where these SOI wafers are used in, are only actually coming to market in 2027. So this is very early.

4- Roughly, what will the demand for SOI wafers be in future

These SOI wafers are used to make Photonic Integrated Circuits (PICs) which are used in things like Transceivers (think AAOIs recent management call about the insane demand for transceivers for 1.6T) as well as is CPO (Co-packaged Optics).

We have already had real world proof from AAOI incoming orders and management commentary that this space will be insanely massive.

Companies like Coherent, Lumentum, AAOI, make products that use PICs (photonic integrated circuits). The insane demand we’ve seen in this space will certaintly lead to a massive increase in SOI wafer production.

The fact that most SOI wafers produced use Smart-Cut technology mean that Soitec will certainly benefit.

Let’s try and quantify it, roughly.

The evolution of PICs used in Datacenters:

I will publish my full demand/supply model for the wafers in the next post (free). It will require more work because their are different kinds of SOI wafers to account for, which have different end uses.

The setup is compelling and demand appears to be building rapidly, and Soitec looks unusually well placed to capture that upside. At roughly 6.5x EV/EBITDA, the stock still does not strike me as priced for that possibility, which made it easy for me to add to the position.

I am long.

My conviction really strengthened once I built out the valuation, which is where I think the numbers start to get interesting.

5- Valuation- and how that relates to how fast the company will grow.

This is how I have modelled the business based Soitec’s own SOI wafer capacity. I have also used bullish assumptions.

Read more

I am quite chuffed with JCU Corporation, up 47% since my post in December. It hasn’t blasted off like other bottleneck plays- but it was always the most compelling Risk to Reward play for me, and I had this sitting at a 40% position initially.

I have reduced exposure because my portfolio suddenly became a one-trick pony, and I’d rather not have all my eggs in one basket.

JCU Corporation (4975.T) Update

• Increased operating profit by +16.4% YoY with the chemicals segment up +9.5% YoY.

• One question I have been trying to answer relentlessy is the bottleneck potential for names like JCU Corporation and C. Uyemura.

• JCU Corporation has more optionality towards hybrid bonding in HBM with its TIPHARES brands - so it might see more upside late 2027, 2028.

• C. Uyemura has more direct exposure to the current AI buildout in its chemicals segment “Wafers & PKG”.

But could the chemicals used hit a bottleneck?

The graph below is for C. Uyemura specifically, BUT, and huge BUT, this information relies heavily on my understanding of their processes.

A bottleneck would occur for chemicals because qualification takes long, there could be a point at which engineers are waiting for new capacity to be qualified but chemicals production capacity hit a bottleneck. But- huge disclaimer- I need to confirm this. If I can, JCU and C. Uyemura could be an early bottleneck play.

I am looking for any expert in this field to please reach out to me regarding the bottleneck potential here.

The other AI adjacent plays I profiled: Wasion Holdings and ChongQing Machinery & Electric Co LTD have both done even better. - Sometimes just recognizing the value others are putting out on Substack and X is all you need to beat the benchmark twice over.

Ever grateful to for ChongQing for Wasion Holdings. If you want some alpha- follow these guys. with only 456 subs on Substack? Undervalued.

Wasion Holdings (3393.HK) Update

Wasion Holdings doubling in share price since the mention. And I took some profits yesterday. But I am also still holding a position as Wayon Energy gets spun-off.

Wayon Energy has three business segments:

1- Smart Distribution Network: Smart Switchgear, high-efficiency transformers, and “Smart Distribution” solutions.

2- Data Center: Power infrastructure projects for power distribution modules, IT containers, HVDC power supply systems. There will be massive growth for this many years out.

3- Energy storage. Energy storage systems and PV + storage microgrids.

• The big story is value-unlocking. Wasion is proposing to spin-off Wayon Energy.

• I believe the share price has increased in part due to the value-unlock and most-part due to the fact that the market realizes its an AI buildout beneficiary.

ChongQing Machinery & Electric Co LTD (2722.HK)

2722.HK doing a solid 40% but still looking fairly priced and still largerly exposed to the AI buildout in China, which seems to lag behind the U.S.

So what’s next? What do I do with my big bag of profits?

Well I have two new picks. One is quite under-followed, the other has very recently started making the rounds on X.com

I believe both are worthy investments.

Read more

For my non-paying subscribers, the paywall initiates just before the meat of the content- Table of contents item 5- Meeting with management. They have provided us with some valuable information that updates our thesis, and gives us relevant information as to where we need to pose our next questions for when we meet with them again.

Table of contents

• Executive summary

• TAM map: advanced copper interconnect chemistry (2025–2030)

  • PCB: HDI microvia fill + fine-line (mSAP/SLP)

  • Packaging (PKG): RDL, Cu pillars, TSV

  • Semiconductor: hybrid bonding + TGV (early-stage)

• Management update (paywalled)

  • What changes vs. the original thesis

  • What was reinforced about business quality

• What it means for the thesis

• Disclosure & disclaimer

• Appendix: sources used for TAM charts

Thank you

I am grateful to my paying subscribers, who enable me to do this work. Quick note before we start: I’m trying to keep this Substack high-signal. I’d rather publish less often and only when there’s genuinely new, decision-useful research to share. If you have preferences on format or frequency after reading this post, message me, this is funded by you, and I’ll adapt.

Executive Summary

Advanced copper interconnect chemistry is a small, high-ASP (average selling price), oligopolistic niche. Each layer of the stack, PCB, PKG, and Semiconductor, has a different growth and moat profile.

However, most of the money (medium-term) will be made in high-end PCBs where HDI Microvia Fill, and Fine-Line Pattern (mSAP), the chemical processes which are used in tandem, lead the growth.

The electronic consumer industry is at the forefront of this demand, with smartphones and their high-end PCBs, at the helm.

Guess who dominates that market? You guessed it… yours truly- The Chosen Stock.

An overview of the TAM for advanced copper interconnect chemistry (via-fill + fine-line + packaging interconnects).

Advanced copper interconnect chemistry is a niche, high-ASP consumables market spanning PCB microvia fill + fine-line patterning, plus advanced packaging interconnects (RDL, Cu pillars, TSV, and eventually hybrid bonding / TGV). Suppliers exist in an oligopoly and tend to be concentrated in the highest-spec processes, and growth is driven by tighter interconnect requirements across smartphones, AI infrastructure, and advanced packaging.

To make it simple, we are looking at three layers of the stack.

1. PCB (Printed circuit board)- The big green slab.

2. PKG- The middle green slab.

3. Semiconductor- The top grey slab.

• PCB (Printed Circuit Board): Think of this as the foundation. It is the sturdy baseboard that physically holds the entire system together and connects the memory (RAM), USBs(ports), power, storage (SSD).

• PKG (Package Substrate): Think of this as the Brain Stem / Translator. The Chip speaks a language of "nanometers" (microscopic), while the PCB speaks "millimeters" (visible to the eye). You cannot connect them directly; it would be like trying to plug a lightning cable into a wall outlet without an adapter. The PKG translates the Chip’s microscopic, fragile signals into a larger, tougher format that the clumsy PCB can actually grab onto.

• Semiconductor (The Chip/Die): Resting on the very top, this is the brain. It is the actual silicon slice where all the computing happens, but it is too fragile and intricate to touch the main circuit board directly without the PKG bridge beneath it.

Within the stack, you can see the copper interconnects.

We’re going to focus on the copper plating consumables market, starting at the PCB layer (microvia fill + fine-line).

PCB (Printed circuit board)- The big green slab.

The image below is my best attempt to conduct a market analysis on the TAM for the chemistry that goes into PCB, and PKG - the TWO green slabs, specifically.

Use the chart as a map: the PCB profit pool is dominated by two things — (1) vertical connectivity (HDI microvia fill) and (2) horizontal wiring density (fine-line patterning via mSAP, often inside SLP boards). Everything else is smaller today, even if some categories are growing fast.

Most modern smartphones use HDI (laser-drilled microvias + build-up layers). The highest-end smartphones use SLP, which is still HDI, but with much finer wiring and is typically enabled by mSAP (Modified Semi-Additive Process- it is a manufacturing technique).

1. HDI (High Density Interconnect)

• What it is: The standard for modern smartphones and laptops for the last decade.

• The Tech: Unlike old-school green circuit boards, HDI uses “Microvias” (tiny laser-drilled holes) to connect different layers of the board. This allows components to be packed tighter together.

• The Process: Circuit formation is often subtractive, but real boards can mix approaches by layer depending on cost/yield/design targets.

2. SLP (Substrate-like Board). (Fine-Line Pattern mSAP).

• SLP is best described as an ultra-high-density form of HDI that moves PCB manufacturing toward package-substrate-like feature sizes and process control.

• What it is: The “Ferrari” of motherboards (or main logic board for you technical guys). It is the next evolution after HDI, used in flagship devices, like the latest iPhones, Samsungs.

• Why “Substrate-like”? It is still technically a motherboard (PBC), but it is built using techniques borrowed from semiconductor packaging (IC Substrates). It bridges the gap between a chip and a board.

• The Tech: It allows for materially finer line width/line spacing (often enabled by mSAP). This shrinks the board size dramatically, leaving more room inside the phone for a bigger battery.

Following the money, HDI Microvia fill and Fine-Line Pattern mSAP (SLP) are where we should keep our focus on. SLP sits on the advanced end of the HDI continuum.

The chemicals for HDI/SLP’s biggest market is mainly smartphone PCBs, but growth is also spurting out in nascent industries that, over time, will add a considerable amount of TAM to this market:

1. Self-Driving cars.

2. VR Headsets.

3. Data centers (this is specifically regarding PCB boards, not PKG substrates)

This is an industry that is positioned to grow however which way you look. I didn’t add smartphones here because it would dwarf the categories below and make the chart look a bit silly (as shown after).

Smartphones currently dominate this market.

The takeaway here is that via filling for high-end (PCBs) for smartphones lead the nominal growth in the advanced copper interconnect chemistry market, but other industries, like automotive ADAS modules and VR/AR, are growing at such a rapid clip (30-50% CAGR) that they are bound to eventually contribute meaningfully to via filling too. There are other nascent industries like advanced robotics, which will, over the long-term, significantly contribute too.

PKG- The middle green slab

The PKG Substrate is where things get more advanced. I do not know different ASP (average selling prices) yet.

The largest advanced packaging interconnect chemistry pools today include RDL and Cu pillar plating; TSV (Through Silicon Via) is the main ‘via’ analogue at the package level.

The PKG substrate is where interconnect chemistry gets more specialized. Here, the big consumables pools are less “via filling” and more advanced interconnect plating, especially RDL (fan-out / redistribution wiring) and Cu pillars (bump replacement for performance packages). TSV is the closest analogue to true via-fill at this layer.

Note* this is a different chart, it is the analysis of the chemistry market for the PKG-Semi layer

*Note: for TGV and hybrid bonding, CAGR is shown as “0%.” (not meaningful) because the markets are too early-stage for clean growth math off a small/zero baseline.

RDL (Redistribution Layer):

• TAM (~$150M, CAGR 19% est 2025- 2030)

  • Status: Common Practice.

  • Context: This is widely used in “Fan-Out” packaging (used in smartphones and processors). While the technology is established, the industry is pushing for “finer” RDL (smaller lines), which keeps the chemical requirements high.

Pillars (Cu Pillar):

• TAM (~$250M, CAGR 13% est 2025- 2030)

  • Status: Standard.

  • Context: These have largely replaced older “solder bumps” (C4 bumps) for performance chips. They are the workhorse connection for the last decade of processors.

Semiconductor Level

Hybrid Bonding:

• TAM - Yet to be seen. Average selling prices will probably be high, but undetermined as of now.

  • Status: New / Ramping Up.

  • Context: This is the “next big leap.” It abandons solder bumps entirely to fuse chips directly (copper-to-copper). It is currently used in high-end 3D stacking (like AMD’s 3D V-Cache) and is the future for “stacking” logic and memory. In the “Advanced Packaging Interconnect Chemistry Market Model” Below TAM is very low- but only because there is very little information out right now- its too new commercially.

Through-Glass Via (TGV):

• TAM - Yet to be seen. Average selling prices will probably be high, but undetermined as of now.

  • Status: Emerging / In Development.

  • Context: This is the most “futuristic” item on the chart. Glass substrates are being developed to replace current resin/organic substrates because they are stiffer and handle heat/signals better. Intel, and others are targeting this for ~2026–2030. It is largely pre-commercial for mass logic production.

Putting it together: the medium-term profit pool for advanced chemistries is concentrated in advanced PCB workflows (HDI to SLP/mSAP), while the packaging and semiconductor layer adds longer-dated optionality (RDL, pillars, TSV, and eventually TGV/hybrid bonding).

With that context, the key question is simple: how much of the “cash engine” does The Chosen One control today, and what does management’s latest commentary change in our original thesis?

I think you will be pleasantly surprised. Let’s dive in.

5. Meeting with management

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In my state of FOMO, I started to dabble deeper and deeper into the supply chain. I was looking for something that was positioned to grow from these tailwinds, but not priced at a nosebleed multiple. I scoured far and wide.

And then I found it.

At first glance, I thought I found a good company. But as I stopped glancing and started really digging, I realized I had found something much rarer.

I found a company flying under the radar, sitting at a most crucial part of the semiconductor stack, but far enough removed that it has zero mentions on X.

• The Moat: It is an Oligopoly, commanding insane margins.

• The Valuation: It is trading at a single-digit EV/EBIT while poised to take advantage of the growth in semiconductors.

• I do NOT need to forecast aggressive growth because the company is perfectly positioned to ride the wave of AI, robotics, and everything chip-related. And it’s AI-exposed segment has been growing very fast.

• Excellent governance.

It’s got a moat that would make Buffett drool but unfortunately he wouldn’t buy because it’s too small (which is another reason it’s undiscovered). It has management that have a firm grasp of governance and capital allocation who have performed extremely well and have earned a exceptional ROIC. And who are investing a lot of money to be close to TSMC.

The company stands to benefit from not just the AI tailwinds, but from robotics, and everything chip related, which in the future- is essentially everything from self-driving cars, unitree’s acrobatic robots, to your AI-infused refrigerator that will soon also be your therapist.

It is, by far, the best company I have written about thus far. (in my career of 10+ years)

Yes, this beats Heritage Insurance (which was a 20-bagger), simply because the risk profile here is superior and the visibility into its future growth is clear. It’s high margin, AI-exposed segment is growing fast, but that growth is currently masked by headwinds in another segment—the perfect confluence of events to create one hell of a bargain.

It stands to benefit from NVIDIA, from TSMC, and supplies names that have already skyrocketed into the stratosphere.

Deep-dive research of this caliber takes weeks to produce and it takes months (years) of rock-turning to find a stock like this. For that reason, the full thesis and the ticker are reserved for paid subscribers.

It is this kind of opportunity I have been waiting for, this kind of quality opportunity that I want my paid subscription to represent. I’m sure you will find it more than worth it.

It’s not just me that thinks this. I reached out to some well-regarded experts to make sure I wasn’t alone in my thinking.

I then sent it to another investor I admire and received this response:

but then after reading-

Last opportunity for my subscribers

Because this is my first ever paid post,

I am pricing my annual subscription at $239 per year.

That’s equivalent to $19.90 per month. For the price of a burger, you get access to institutional grade research that aims to compound your wealth significantly.

If you subscribe at this price, you lock that price in- forever after I will be priced somewhere between $300 and $400.

After that, the price goes up. No exceptions.

Subscribe now. This is the stock that is worth it.

Subscribe now

A quick note for everyone who previously pledged at a lower price: when I switched this Substack from “pledges” to full paid, Substack did not automatically turn those pledges into subscriptions. It treated my new $239 plan as a different thing entirely, removed the old pledge list- there was a setting I should have enabled but I missed it on this first attempt. My apologies.

I can only see who left a note for the pledge. I will honor that note with 6 free months. You should see this email still, but now you need to ‘convert’ again. If you pledged at a lower price, please forward me your ‘pledged’ email and I’ll give you the comp.

I greatly appreciate your support.

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Closed Out Positions:

$LFMD

I took off most of my $LFMD for a 95% gain. (I did post about this on twitter).

I do realize that this sort of ‘trading’ needs to be better publicised. I expect to do a similar thing with my recently initiated position $QFIN- if we get a short-term pop, I would rather lock in the gain, especially something like 100% within a few months. I generally leave on a small tracer position, because there have been too many times where I see something blast off further.

The rest I got out basically at break-even but it was a nice ride. Market was not discounting the growth, since then, the thesis has changed quite a bit and I will not be re-instating a position.

Earnings Updates:

$CCSI

Still holding full position.

has completely round-tripped, from up 60% after posting to only up 5%. However, I think after the post-earnings plunge it offers an even better entry point. It has also been sold off further in this whole “small-caps mini-sell-off”, which I think offers a good opportunity for everyone. The situation with is far better than when I first posted it. I’m VERY bullish on CCSI at this price.

TL;DR - Corporate segment is growing, net retention rate is at 102% (perfect), management has almost hit debt-paydown goal and has indicated it will use cash flow on more equity buybacks. This looks better than when I originally wrote it up (even with the price appreciation factored in).

Price Action post earnings surprised me. I like the results. Management is being risk-averse using most of the excess cash flow to pay down debt (not a bad thing).

SOHO is down, naturally. Eventually SOHO’s decline will taper, but that is not core to our thesis- management is investing marketing dollars into growing the corporate segment.

Free cash flow of $44.4m in one quarter on a stock with a market cap of $474m. This is absurdly cheap, and generating tons of cash. Hoping next quarter we see a bunch used for share repurchases- given the history of capital allocation, its highly likely.

Share based compensation (SBC):

SBC runs at around 18% of Free Cash Flow. It is quite generous. Digging further, we see that the price at where the PSUs vest are around $30. And then a mega amount at like $60.

Management has incentive to keep get the price to $60, because that’s actually where they make bank. The market will probably use this zone to sell, or it might be a point of resistance.

That being said, the price is cheap at these levels, and management is incentivized to increase the share price. My target to get out is around $50-55, before the real PSU’s vest.

Most importantly, the shares outstanding is decreasing, so the SBC is not disrupting the mechanics of buyback engine too much. Technically speaking, the reduction in shares outstanding leads to constant upward pressure on the share price.

$BETS-B

Still holding full position.

Bettsons total shareholder return (Dividend% + Sharebuyback%) is around 8%. I’m very happy to have this while Bettson continues to grow.

We have now completely round-tripped on Betsson AB since I posted. I am still holding my full position and I think the market is drastically undervaluing the company. I believe the pressure on the share price is from general iGaming market pressures- none of which I believe are that fundamental to Bettson given the growth in Brazil, and the rest of the South American market. The company, and the industry, are still growing fast there and its a big market.

Betsson is trading at an EV/EBITDA multuple of ~5-6X, compared to 15X+ which is the industry norm (especially for an established player like Betsson).

This reminds me a lot of my Super Group call which has done 200% since I posted. I believe Betsson is extremely well run, and in a similar position- I think its undervalued because of where its listed. They reported earnings a while ago (all good stuff)- here was my update.

$8371.HK Taste Gourmet Group Ltd

Still holding full position.

Taste Gourmet is doing as expected. Its up 25% since posting and that’s excluding its dividend, which is now running at a forward rate of around 10%.

It’s doing FAR better than the other restaurant groups I spoke about in the writeup. And I believe this is because management is balanced in their expansion strategy.

The market looks too pessimistic given what Taste Gourmet has been able to achieve over the last year.

Cash flow is extremely strong. Remember we have to account for lease payments which show up in the financing section of the cash flow statement. But dividends are up, and EBIT is up, and I am happy with the results. Not too much to say about this business but there are a few points to note:

1. Average spend decreased slightly, so we will have to monitor this.

2. New stores opened are still getting to max profitability, so there will be a constant drag on margins until this company stops opening new stores- at which point market will get a very clear indication of what steady state earnings will be, and multiple expansion should increase.

QFIN Qfin Holdings Inc

Still holding half a position. Not increasing.

QFIN is still extremely cheap. Like, extremely. And they are plunging their cash flow into buybacks and dividends. What’s not to like?

The reason I am not adding here is because the business got slightly weaker, but not weak enough to justify a complete change in the fundamentals, or the thesis. If I see the thesis changes fundamentally, I will cut this completely. Right now, its a wait-and-see.

There’s isn’t too much to add. What to watch:

1. Composition of their business- capital heavy vs capital light. (They have essentially two business segments- one where they lend money to consumers and they themselves bare the risk, and the other where their platform facilitates other lenders to make loans (the super high margin great business). It moved slightly to their more capital heavy business.

2. Delinquency rates increased. But within range of what they have seen historically. This is the MAIN thing to watch. If delinquency rates increase too much, then it signals there is a fundamental change in the structure of the market where they operate. We have seen this in China before, in China the market changes fast because the government is constantly tinkering with policy.

The short report Grizzly reported was basically (I think) just fear and doom and allowed grizzly to put a short position on and take it off immediately after they posted. It was lazy research. Their main “short-points” were:

1- SARM numbers not being the same as the SEC financials. QFIN has come out and publicly stated the numbers Grizzly used are wrong. I have not seen the documents, I tried to access them but cannot gain access even with my connections in China.

2. The governance is shady. Their main point was that the former controlling shareholder is a fraud. He doesn’t control the group anymore, though. The two points Grizzly makes are contradicting, if the company doesn’t make any money, then how have they such a large quantity on dividends and buybacks? If you have been following Grizzly Research for some time, you will know that they have been called out for having done lazy research. My honest opinion is that they run a short-fun where they post a ‘doom-report’ to benefit off of a short-term sell-off then cover their position immediately. Basically market manipulation, but in the gray area where they cannot properly get in trouble legally, even though they face a few lawsuits.

OMSE Energy Technologies Inc

Still holding full position.

What a crazy market it has been for $OMSE. In the two weeks after I posted, the stock surged some 60-70%, only to completely round-trip back to where I bought it!

Its an interesting investing-psychology experiment, as it was zooming up many were messaging me asking if its still undervalued, is it still worth getting into at the current, elevated price? I wonder how many people now will want to get in now that the price has dropped. If you felt more confident as the price was rising- congratulations because you fell victim to ‘herd-mentality bias’. If you can start noticing what that feels like, becoming more aware of it, you can make real money in the stock market. You will always ‘feel’ that, its built into your primal psychic architecture. But notice it, be aware, and then go against it- when the fundamentals tell you to.

The earnings were fine. Management stated that current earnings were depressed from the norm due to abnormally large orders from their Saudi customer in the first half.

Welcome to small caps.

If we go on what the CEO says, the business is fine. Just fluctuating orders. He says demand is still great. Backlog is strong.

More importantly were his comments on capital allocation, which was essentially a non-answer given he said they would use the proceeds for everything- organic growth, joint ventures, acquisitions. He is just leaving the door open for any opportunity. If they can keep growing organically we can be happy. This company is dirt cheap.

Q3 update

CorMedix’s Q3 looks great for the original thesis!

They reported $104.3m in net revenue, of which $88.8m was Defencath and about $15.5m came from one month of Melinta. Adjusted EBITDA was $72m.

On the thesis:

• We are getting validated on our “Defencath launches well, throws off real cash, and gives them bargaining power for post-TDAPA”. LDO(Large Dialysis Organization) uptake is running ahead of expectation, and we’re already seeing strong EBITDA.

  

• The part that says “long-term value depends on what happens after TDAPA and the add-on periods” is still unresolved. Q3 doesn’t answer what net price or what patient retention you get once Defencath is fully inside the bundle, it only shows they’re going into that phase with much more firepower.

On valuation,

1. EV now:
   With the stock around $11.4, roughly 86m diluted shares out, $150m of converts and about $56m of cash and short-term investments, you’re looking at an enterprise value in the ballpark of $1bn

2. Current EBITDA:
   Q3 adjusted EBITDA was about $72m. Real Operating income around $50m. If you do nothing fancy and just annualise that single quarter (4 × 72), you get roughly $288m of “run-rate” EBITDA. Bear in mind- EBITDA should be growing like crazy until it gets fuzzy at H2 2026.

3. Forward EV/EBITDA using that 72m:
   Take an EV of about $1.0bn and divide by a $288m run-rate and you land at a forward 3.5× “Q3-run-rate” EV/EBITDA. Again- this is using a low EBITDA. EBITDA will most likely grow until H2 2026.

So unless the share price starts going up fast, this is going to hit a lot of screens as investors start seeing a company growing at double digits, with an EV/EBITDA below 5.

Below, the light-blue is my really meager assumptions. H2, 2026- we don’t really know what will happen with the prices of the vials, or the amount of patients on Defencath.

But at this price, with the economic value of this drug, this is a bet I want to take. Increasing my position.

From a health expert who works in the healthcare space in the U.S:

The opportunity has substantially de-risked since I first published on it. I'm using this as an opportunity to increase my position. This is not financial advice.

2. The acquisitions and what they do to the thesis

The Melinta deal is what really changes the story.

CorMedix closed Melinta on 29 August, paying with cash plus $150m of converts and some equity. In Q3 you saw just one month of Melinta revenue (about $15.5m, of which $12.8m were portfolio sales) flow into CorMedix’s P&L. Management now talks about $400m of pro forma revenue and $230m of fully-synergised adjusted EBITDA for 2025, implying a much larger, more diversified business but still with a core cash generator which is Defencath.

For our thesis it’s a positive. It means the company is more diversified. More avenues to make cash, and the acquisition happened at a decent multiple.

3. Some tidbits from the call that I enjoyed.

This might be confusing, but Medicare Fee-for-Service is different from Medicare Advantage. What Todisco is really saying is that Defencath today is used mostly in FFS patients, while Medicare Advantage is now the largest dialysis cohort that they’ve barely penetrated. That’s great because MA plans aren’t bound by the post-TDAPA add-on and can contract separately if the real-world data show Defencath truly cuts infections and hospitalisations.

or $3660.HK

Here is my TL;DR thesis:

The China Fintech lending sector has currently been oversold. The best of the bunch (undervalued + great business model) is QFIN. The market is waaay too pessimistic, and the business fundamentals are fine. I expect this to re-rate 100%+.

I believe the sector-wide sell-off in Chinese fintech was caused by consumer-finance reforms, and investors being skittish on China in general. Yes- I have watched the China-Hustle. I am well aware of the reverse-merger scams that were run. I do not believe QFIN is a scam, but I do believe that many investors believe China to be completely ‘un-investable’ and I thank them, because its for that reason we can make money, reliably, investing in China.

• Cheap & High Margin, capital light, Cash generator: EV/EBIT ≈ 2–3× and ~3-4× P/E. Net cash and active cash returns (dividend + buybacks).

• Upside: On mid-cycle EV/EBIT 5–6× (still conservative), equity is ~2–3× from here without needing growth to accelerate, just prove underwriting and keep ≥50% capital-light mix.

• Why it’s mispriced: sentiment shock after cautious Q3 guide, data-policy headlines, slight QoQ dip in capital-light share, and convert-arb overhang. None of those break the cash engine.

• What the risks are: PRC policy/VIE/HFCAA framework, mix drift back to credit-heavy, related-party ecosystem (360), credit cycle, and partner concentration.

An opportunity for my subscribers

There are only 2 spots left to subscribe to an annual pledge at the bargain price $239/year. That’s $19/month, basically the price of a burger.

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What does QFIN do?

A credit-tech platform. They connect financial institutions with consumers who need credit. One of their business segments provides the credit but they also generate revenue from service fees. QFIN provides the plumbing, scoring, and servicing and earns fees.

The loans are small, on average ~9000RMB or $1,200. To individuals and small to medium enterprises (SMEs). Exact portion is not disclosed.

They have two main segments:

1- Credit-Driven Services: On balance sheet lending

2- Platform & Referral Services: Off balance sheet loan facilitation

1- Credit-Driven Services: On balance sheet lending

Not much to explain here- they loan to their own customers (small loans)

2- Platform & Referral Services: Off balance sheet loan facilitation

(capital light): Acquires borrowers through its app. Scores them using AI and credit data. Matches them with partner banks (who provide the funding). QFin charges the banks (or lenders) service fees.

This segment is high margin.

My thesis doesn’t rely on the company growing revenue. It relies on stabilization (which we see fundamentally in the numbers already), and a nice growing mix towards more Platform (higher margin, more SaaS-like).

Price to earnings graph for QFIN now at ~3.

Dividends and Buybacks

The dividend yield sits at ~6% but I think the real value will come from a re-rate back to a P/E of ~6 or ~10.

Buybacks, though, could force a re-rate faster, or at least force share upwards even if the multiple stays the same.

Normally when you find a company like this its a value trap because management don’t pay shareholders. Here, they are paying shareholders.

This is a risk I want to take. I’m betting against you, Mr. Market. They have capacity to repurchase up to mid-teens percent of the float at current prices, which would be disgustingly accretive.

Risks

The main risks I see here are some policy-driven factors. Regulators could tighten the noose- historically we have seen this. China has a problem with shadow lenders, which Beijing has been reforming.

ADR wrapper / US-listing risk can be avoided by buying directly on the HKEX. The VIE and PRC policy risks are the same either way; I think the market is overpricing them.

• Cheap: EV/EBIT ≈ 1–2× (EV ≈ $75m vs. FY25 EBIT ≈ $60m) and ~3× P/E; cash-rich, no debt.

• Real Cash Flow: FY25 revenue ≈ $204m, ~29% EBIT margin, solid operating cash flow.

• Upside: On mid-cycle EBIT $40–45m, a modest 5–6× EV/EBIT implies a 2–3× equity upside from here.

• Why it’s mispriced: small float/low liquidity + governance overhang + fear that FY25 was a one-customer spike.

• What the risks are: backlog and contract quality, customer concentration.

An opportunity for my subscribers

There are only 6 spots left to subscribe to an annual pledge at the bargain price $229/year. That’s $18/month, basically the price of a burger.

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What does OMSE do?

OMS Energy Technologies makes the metal “plumbing” for oil and gas wells.
Their core products are high-strength connectors and pipes that screw together to prevent leaks.

They also build the surface wellhead assemblies whcih are the valves and controls at the top of a well, and do premium threading and related services.
They don’t produce oil themselves, they sell equipment and services mainly to operators in Asia and the Middle East.

Saudi Aramco is and was their biggest customer for financial year end 2025, contributing 67% of their total revenue. At the current valuation, and given where the oil price is, I am more than happy to invest. Investing in the Oil & Gas industry is as simple as buying low and selling high, don’t overcomplicate it. And right now, its low.

I am not overly concerned about the concentration risk. They have a 10-year supply agreement with Saudi Aramco that they signed in 2024. See an excerpt from the news release below.

The $120-$200 million is management guidance, nothing contractual.

Where I think the market is wrong

I think this stock sold off along with the oil market. It’s a recent IPO, its tiny, not many people are on this- yet.

I have made money in the oil market before, and I don’t overcomplicate it. I buy a small-cap that's undervalued when oil is low and its a strategy that hasn’t failed me. Well- we are at that point again.

The IPO

The company IPO’d at $9. So shares have dropped in half since then. The proceeds are for “R&D, marketing & sales, compliance/governance, working capital” - so essentially just growth money raised to support execution and their Aramco contract.

The big risks

• Aramco doesn’t order as much stuff as the company guided.

• The majority holder (founder) isn’t friendly to minority shareholders. (wait and see). Founder is locked up for 180 days from the final prospectus (so lock-up expiry is around early Nov 2025). Watch for post-lock-up selling plans or 10b5-1 programs.

This company is kind of a dream, it ticks so many boxes, and the first one is that the market is SO pessimistic on it for reasons I can see but don’t agree with.

• We have a company here with a sticky SaaS product trading at EV/EBITDA ~5.5

• Growing Revenue!

• 80% Gross profit margin and a close to ~45% EBIT margin.

• Spin-off, so forced sellers pushed price down.

If there is literally one skill an investor needs to outperform, its the ability to buy when others are pessimistic. When things seem bad.

CCSI has been battered. Bad optics. It dropped 10% on a debt downgrade (that I can argue was fundamentally better for the company).

Right now, I’m buying from pessimists. I am LONG.

An opportunity for my subscribers

Of my last five Substack pitches, two have already doubled. The others? Still playing out.

Now I’ve got another opportunity for you, the chance to lock in my research at 50% off.

I’m not going paid yet. This is just for those who want to pledge early and secure access before the gate closes.

For the first 10 annual pledges, it’s just $199/year. That’s $16/month—basically the price of a burger.

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What does CCSI do?

A patient walks into a clinic with a weird wart in a weird place. The doctor needs to know if the insurer will pay, so he tells the nurse to send a prior-authorization.

The nurse fills in the details and hits Send. It looks like a fax, but there’s no fax machine. It’s 2025. Either the clinic or the insurer (often both) uses CCSI’s eFax: they keep a normal fax number, and the “fax” is delivered digitally, encrypted, logged, with a delivery receipt into a web inbox or straight into their system.

The industry is trying to move off fax. A newer standard, FHIR, lets clinics, hospitals, and insurers send the data itself (as tidy JSON) so software can auto-populate the patient’s record instead of a human re-typing a PDF.

Here’s where CCSI bridges both worlds (with its new products Unite, and Clarity):

• Unite: when the counterparty already supports APIs, that same Send action skips the PDF/fax entirely. Unite packages the prior-auth as FHIR and delivers it straight to the insurer’s endpoint (no phone lines).

• Clarity: when something arrives as a fax or PDF, say a small practice’s handwritten note, Clarity reads it (OCR/NLP), pulls out the patient info and codes, and drops clean, structured data back into the hospital’s system.

Most hospitals already run Epic Systems as their electronic health record. Epic is where doctors chart and store data, the inside of the hospital. CCSI operates between organizations: it moves information to payers, pharmacies, agencies, and small clinics that are all at different tech levels.

Epic does offer native FHIR/Direct rails, but CCSI gives one workflow with two rails (API when available, secure cloud fax when not), plus the cross-organization transmission audit trail, credential/key management, retries, and automatic failover, all without a new IT project every time a partner upgrades or breaks an endpoint.

Fax is shrinking, but it isn’t gone. The long tail still posts fax numbers, and the U.S. hasn’t banned fax. CCSI keeps those connections working now, while quietly flipping them to APIs with Unite and cleaning the leftovers with Clarity. That’s why Epic doesn’t “replace” CCSI: Epic keeps the chart straight; CCSI gets the chart across the moat, on whatever rail the other side can handle today, while the industry transitions.

Where I think the market is wrong

If you run a reverse DCF, the market is pricing CCSI as if…

• …margins collapse from ~45–54% EBITDA to ~35%
  (yet in reality the mix is shifting to higher-margin API/AI products—Unite/Clarity drop the telecom tolls).

• …revenue declines structurally
  (in reality the Corporate (enterprise/healthcare) segment is growing ~5–6% YoY, the revenue headline dip was a deliberate pull-back in low-value SoHo (Small office/Home office) advertising).

• …it’s barely a going concern
  (they still print roughly $120m a year in FCF and are steadily deleveraging toward <2.5× net-debt/EBITDA).

Their revenue is far stickier than the market believes: hospitals keep their long-standing fax numbers for compliance and routing, and CCSI’s dual-rail setup (fax today, FHIR/Direct when ready) means customers can modernize without switching vendors. The base doesn’t need to churn for the mix to improve.

Topline Revenue decline

Two segments:

Corporate

• ~60k clients, up from 55k a year ago.

• Net-dollar retention ~101% (vs 97.9% a year ago).

• ARPA = $306.54/month.

• Q1-25 revenue $54.3m, +5.6% YoY (record).

• Margins: company adj. EBITDA ~54%; Corporate is the driver.

• Story: sticky enterprise bridge (cloud fax + Unite APIs + Clarity doc-AI), baked-in audits/compliance, dual-rail (API when possible, secure fax when not).

SoHo

• Strategic pullback: Management cut digital ads; letting the low-ARPU tail run off.

• ARPA = $14.83/month.

• Monthly churn 3.26% (lowest in 14 quarters; improving).

• Q1-25 revenue $32.8m, –10.6% YoY; accounts 730k (vs 808k LY).

• Lower margin vs Corporate; shrinking by design while cash is redeployed to delever and enterprise growth.

Corporate is the sticky bridge business. Cloud fax + API + document AI for institutions that must connect to thousands of messy outsiders. It’s growing mid-single digits with 100%+ retention and has 54% EBITDA margins.

SoHo is the deliberately pruned retail tail: low ARPU, higher churn, and shrinking by design after ad cuts. As more partners move to APIs, CCSI keeps the customer and earns more per transaction—because Unite/Clarity carry fatter margins than fax minutes.

Valuation

Path to value realization

• Debt paydown will increase net income via interest saved. Every $100m retired saves =$6–6.5m annual. That is a LOT.

• Buybacks. Buybacks after debt paydown will re-rate company to 10 EV/EBITDA or higher.

• Corporate keeps growing.

The big risks

• Epic/FHIR : Hospitals route via Epic/native hubs and cancel CCSI.

• API ramp stalls: Unite/Clarity adoption too slow, “fax dinosaur” multiple persists.

• Policy shock (fax bans): Sudden drop in faxable workflows.

Monitor

The big two- how we tell if this thing is working or not:

1. We watch corporate seat retention, if it drops below 98% we may have a problem, and I may have misunderstood how sticky their product is.

2. Interop (Unite/Clarity) revenue: if their new products grow, they will cement stickiness and longevity.

These are the fundamental risks I see for the company. If either plays out it means that clients are probably moving off CCSI and onto Epic Systems.

Everything kind of depends on the price of DefenCath after the TDAPA cliff-effect.

I would like for you, the reader, to understand that this is likely to be an extremely volatile stock. Press releases on the rollout to LDOs, news from the CMS, or even the RWE data could create extremely wild swings in the stock price.

What Could Break the Thesis?

Everything comes down to DefenCath’s price after the TDAPA cliff. What would break the thesis:

• MA (Medicare Advantage) plans might refuse to pay extra.

• CMS could say, “We’re bundling it at the standard rate—take it or leave it.”

• LDOs (Large Dialysis Organizations) might simply say, “We can’t afford it.”

If DefenCath can hold its price at even $50 per vial, the company could do very well.

Understanding CMS, Medicare Advantage, and DefenCath

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the government agency that sets the rules and pays for dialysis care. Traditional Medicare (government) pays clinics a bundled rate (referred to as the ERSD bundle) for each dialysis treatment—about $265 per session—which covers all the basics: staff, supplies, and routine medications.

Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are private insurers that get a monthly payment from CMS to cover all a patient’s care—including dialysis, hospitalizations, and medications. These plans have more flexibility than CMS to negotiate directly with companies like CorMedix to adopt new treatments.

Right now, CMS supports DefenCath through the TDAPA program, paying clinics the full price of the drug (about $250 per vial) for the first two years, making it financially easy to adopt. But after that, payments start to drop. Even if DefenCath proves it saves money by preventing costly infections, TDAPA’s structure is unlikely to change—the price drop-off (the “cliff effect”) will likely stay in place.

What CorMedix is really hoping for (and would turn it into a 20 bagger) is something called a carve-out—where CMS decides that DefenCath is so valuable that they pay for it outside the $265 dialysis bundle. But historically, CMS very very rarely grants carve-outs, and given the size of the dialysis bundle, adding a $250 drug per session would blow the budget apart.

Examples of Drugs that Failed to Get a Permanent Carve-Out (BUT):

Cinacalcet (Sensipar) — after its initial separate payment (TDAPA-like) ended, it was folded into the ESRD bundle in 2020. This caused losses for dialysis clinics, who then limited its use due to the high price.

• Cinacalcet reduced hospitalizations (by managing secondary hyperparathyroidism) but CMS folded it in anyway.

• Outcome: Use of the drug dropped and patients’ access suffered.

Phosphate Binders — previously paid separately, now bundled (effective Jan 1, 2025).

• Despite concerns that including them in the bundle might harm patient access, CMS moved forward with bundling to simplify payment.

Read about more of the CMS problems here. Bundling caused large volume drops in many innovative new therapies.

But: These drugs above didn’t have the extreme life & cost saving potential DefenCath has.

Proving DefenCath’s Worth

I am quite unconcerned about CorMedix being able to prove DefeCath’s worth in RWE studies, for a few reasons.

1. The cost of a CRBSI (catheter related blood stream infection) is extremely high. (~$90,000-$120,000). So DefenCath will be able to reduce costs.

2. The European ‘copy’, Taurolock, is extremely similar and has been proven in a few European RWE studies.

3. I feel like the clinical study’s results were more of a verification of other research that is already out there.

The TDAPA Bridge

TDAPA was created by CMS to encourage innovation. It allows new renal drugs and biologics to be paid outside of the bundle at their full wholesale price for a limited time—usually two years. And then there’s the 65% post TDAPA adjustment that runs for another 3 years. The post-adjustment was introduced in 2024.

TDAPA isn’t perfect, it actually discourages innovation in some ways. Plenty of folks in the industry have pointed out its flaws. Some companies have even pulled their products because the structure just didn’t work (e.g., GSK with Jesduvroq) . So while TDAPA helps DefenCath right now, I fully expect changes to be made in the future to make the program work better for innovative therapies. Only a crystal ball can answer how or when those changes will come.

For DefenCath the post-TDAPA adjustment was a critical lifeline. Its current Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) is approximately $250 per vial. Under TDAPA, Medicare reimburses that full amount per vial, letting dialysis providers integrate DefenCath without jeopardizing their margins.

*DefenCath is also covered by NTAP (New Technology Add-On Payment) which is a Medicare reimbursement system that gives hospitals extra payments for adopting new, innovative treatments. For DefenCath, this means hospitals receive additional money on top of the regular DRG payment when they use the product during an inpatient stay. It helps hospitals afford new therapies while Medicare collects data for possible future inclusion in bundled rates.

June 2026 is where the risk gets turned on high. Even with the post-TDAPA adjustment, would the LDOs absorb the difference in price? I don’t believe they will, but the MA plans might.

Management’s Strategy

CorMedix’s team knows the cliff is coming. That’s why they’re working on:

• Proving DefenCath’s value through RWE—tracking infection rates, hospitalizations, and cost savings.

• Negotiating value-based deals with MA plans and LDOs to share risk and keep the price sustainable.

Medicare Advantage: Where the Real Opportunity Lies

About half of all ESRD patients are now in MA plans. Each infection costs these plans $90,000–$120,000, so they’re motivated to pay for prevention. CorMedix is betting that DefenCath can show enough real-world cost savings that MA plans will carve out payments or negotiate a value-based contract—keeping DefenCath priced sustainably even after TDAPA ends.

It won’t be easy—MA plans have budget constraints and need solid data. But that’s where the opportunity lies. If DefenCath’s data is strong, MA plans might just become its biggest supporters.

Other Opportunities for DefenCath

I haven’t yet touched on the other opportunities CorMedix is going for:

1. TPN (Total Parenteral Nutrition)

2. Inpatient (hospitals)

Total Parenteral Nutrition is a method of feeding patients intravenously when they can’t eat or absorb nutrients, often due to serious gastrointestinal diseases, short bowel syndrome, or certain cancers. Delivered via central venous catheters (CVCs) or PICCs, TPN carries a high risk of Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infections (CLABSIs), with infection rates up to 26% and mortality rates of 12–25% per case. CorMedix is currently running a Phase III trial testing DefenCath in TPN patients to reduce these infections, targeting a U.S. market of approximately 4.7 million TPN infusions annually—a potential market worth $500 million to $750 million depending on price and penetration. Management forecasts peak annual sales of $150–200 million for DefenCath in this segment if it achieves solid uptake. The trial began enrolling patients in early 2025 and is expected to complete by late 2026 or early 2027.

Inpatient

DefenCath also targets hospital inpatients with ESRD and AKI—patients who often need a CVC for dialysis. Right now, hospitals get a break thanks to the New Technology Add-On Payment (NTAP)—Medicare covers 75% of DefenCath’s cost on top of the standard DRG payment. But that’s temporary and once NTAP expires in November 2026, hospitals will have to cover DefenCath from the same bundled DRG payment that also funds the patient’s entire stay. It’s a much smaller market compared to the LDOs.

Scenarios?

I could lay out a bunch of scenarios—bear, base, bull—but I feel like that wouldn’t really do justice to this situation. This is a drug that’s needed. It saves money. It saves lives.

The real crux of the thesis comes down to what kind of deals CorMedix can work out with CMS and Medicare Advantage plans. We’re in pretty uncharted territory here. But I believe DefenCath’s benefits are strong enough that they’ll create a big “pull” from stakeholders who want to see it adopted—even if that means tweaking policy to make it work.

We need to closely monitor those discussions, and the rollout. That will tell us what we need to know.

In the early 2000s, European anesthesiologists faced a recurring problem: reliably reversing deep muscle paralysis after surgery. Their standard agent, neostigmine, often caused bradycardia, nausea, and sometimes left patients with lingering weakness. Then, around 2008, surgeons in Europe began using sugammadex—a novel “molecular cage” that grabbed rocuronium molecules and restored muscle function within minutes. Real‐world reports from London to Madrid showed faster awakenings, fewer respiratory complications, and almost no cholinergic side effects.

Despite these promising European outcomes, U.S. hospitals couldn’t adopt sugammadex immediately. Under FDA rules, even a treatment proven overseas needed its own American clinical trials before any U.S. patient could receive it. In practice, this meant that sugammadex had to be manufactured under U.S. Good Manufacturing Practices and tested in Phase II/III studies across U.S. centers—no shortcuts. Organon (later Merck), and NOT the company I am writing up, launched trials from Boston to San Francisco, comparing sugammadex against neostigmine in diverse American cohorts. They confirmed what their European colleagues had already seen: sugammadex reversed rocuronium blockade in under two minutes on average, with far fewer side effects.

By December 2015, after rigorous U.S. trials and on‐site inspections, the FDA granted approval for Bridion (sugammadex). American anesthesiologists, who had watched European successes from afar, could finally use a standardized, reliably manufactured product. Suddenly, patients at high risk of postoperative breathing problems—whether elderly or with chronic lung disease—could be extubated safely and swiftly.

Sugammadex’s journey highlights three lessons:

1. Innovations may flourish abroad first, but U.S. patients need FDA‐approved data before they can benefit even when there is conclusive data abroad.

2. Even proven foreign therapies require domestic trials, ensuring safety and efficacy in American populations.

3. Leveraging European research—instead of reinventing the molecule—can streamline FDA approval, turning an overseas breakthrough into a lifesaving option for U.S. patients.

Today I will present to you an opportunity with striking parallels:

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The Opportunity is CorMedix

Imagine you have a friend named Tom who needs dialysis three times a week. While dialysis is lifesaving, it also means Tom may have a special tube—a central venous catheter (CVC)—permanently inserted into his bloodstream. And every time he’s not getting dialysis, that tube becomes a potential breeding ground for dangerous bacteria. These bacteria can enter Tom’s bloodstream and cause a catheter-related bloodstream infection (CRBSI)—a life-threatening complication that can derail his treatment and even endanger his life.

These infections are shockingly common: up to 25% of patients with CVCs will develop a CRBSI (catheter related blood stream infection), often within the first few months. And the consequences are devastating. Each infection costs the healthcare system an average of $63,000 due to hospitalizations, extra treatments, and extended care. Worse still, about 25% of patients with CRBSIs (catheter related blood stream infections) die within 90 days, making these infections a top cause of death in patients with end-stage renal disease. For patients like Tom—and the healthcare systems that care for them—CRBSIs represent a massive burden that demands a better solution.

To prevent this, hospitals use what’s called a catheter lock solution—a small amount of fluid that’s instilled into the catheter between uses. Think of it like a protective plug: it keeps the tube open and flushes out any lurking bacteria, helping Tom stay safe between dialysis sessions.

In Europe, doctors discovered a clever solution called TauroLock. It combines taurolidine, a natural antimicrobial derived from an amino acid, with citrate (an anticoagulant). Taurolidine acts like a microscopic shield, coating the inside of the catheter to prevent bacteria and fungi from forming colonies, making it much harder for infections to take hold. Over time, TauroLock became so effective that it’s now recommended as a standard-of-care catheter lock in many European guidelines, helping protect countless dialysis patients from life-threatening infections.

I have no proof that CorMedix got the idea from Europe but its likely they did and wondered “Why aren’t we using this here?”. Regardless of whether they got the idea from Europe, CorMedix decided to develop their own solution for U.S. patients. Instead of using citrate, they paired taurolidine with heparin, an anticoagulant more commonly used in the U.S. dialysis setting. The result was DefenCath, a catheter lock solution designed to fight infections and keep the catheter open.

After rigorous clinical trials—including a study that showed a 71% reduction in infections—DefenCath won FDA approval in November 2023. It’s now making its way into hospitals and dialysis clinics (its biggest market) across America, giving patients like Tom a fighting chance against dangerous infections that can sideline their treatment and threaten their lives.

• CRBSI (Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections) are a major problem in patients with central venous catheters, with up to 25% of patients developing an infection—often within the first few months. These infections cost the healthcare system an estimated $63,000 per case and represent a significant burden both financially and clinically. DefenCath addresses this problem.

• TauroLock is widely used in Europe, especially for high-risk patients, and has demonstrated strong efficacy in preventing catheter-related infections in RWE (Real World Evidence) studies. DefenCath takes a similar approach, using taurolidine but pairing it with heparin—a common anticoagulant in U.S. dialysis settings—instead of citrate. Clinical Studies should look very similar for Defencath.

• Real-world evidence (RWE) from European studies on taurolidine-based catheter lock solutions like TauroLock shows substantial efficacy in preventing infections. Given that DefenCath uses the same active ingredient—taurolidine—but pairs it with heparin instead of citrate (just an anticoagulant), I expect DefenCath’s results to be very similar to that of Taurolock. RWE studies for DefenCath (coming out next month) should look almost identical to its clinical studies- incentivizing more Medicare support, and incentivizing insurers to foot the entire bill to save money on their patients.

Worst-Case Scenario on CorMedix

Allow me to first peak your interest with my absolute worst-case scenario anaylsis on CorMedix. I will explain all the nitty gritty details afterwards, which are very important to understand in order to build conviction.

My worst worst worst case gives CorMedix a terminal value of $1.8Bn. Double its current market price. I also don’t calculate any NPV for 2025 or 2026 even though 2026 could be a very big year for CorMedix.

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You’ll fall off your chair when you see my base case.

My worst-case scenario assumptions include:

• Market Penetration: I assume DefenCath captures only 10% of its Total Addressable Market (TAM) by the end of 2027—a very conservative estimate considering CorMedix has already achieved approximately 2% penetration from one of the smallest dialysis organizations and has already signed up the others.

• No TAM Penetration Growth: I assume the TAM penetration remains flat beyond 2027, despite strong clinical results and DefenCath’s compelling value proposition as a life-saving therapy.

• Severe Price Erosion: I assume DefenCath faces significant price erosion from the TDAPA price-drop off (which I will explain nicely later), due to failed negotiations with Medicare Advantage plans, increased hospital price pressures, and hypothetical competition (though no direct competitors currently exist). Even in a bear-case scenario, pricing would likely remain well above the level I assume here.

• High Operating Expenses: I assume operating expenses remain elevated, significantly higher than the company’s current trajectory and guidance would suggest.

Large Dialysis Organizations (LDOs)

CorMedix currently has agreements with four of the five largest dialysis organizations- which represent some 70%~ of their TAM. They are tabled below. The rest of their TAM will come from hospitals, but will take longer to roll out (they already have sales-teams in place, but I don’t even incorporate this into my analysis).

Of these five (below), US Renal Care is the only one who has implemented and ordered- the others are still rolling out and should roll out before year.

CorMedix already has a contract with either DaVita or Fresenius, but they have not disclosed which one. If only half of the CVC patients from either of them use DefenCath my worst-case scenario is null and void.

TAM and DefenCath Studies

CorMedix estimates its Total Addressable Market (TAM) at around 170,000 patients—mostly dialysis patients who rely on central venous catheters. My own research supports this figure, landing just a bit lower but well within the same ballpark.

Now, here’s where it gets fun: CorMedix has already signed contracts that cover about 70% of this TAM. The clinics are onboard and it’s just a matter of rolling out the product and getting patients started on DefenCath. That rollout is happening now, and investors are hungry for details. Every earnings call is filled with questions about what the dialysis organizations are saying, how many patients are lined up, and how quickly those patients are being converted to DefenCath.

Personally, I’m not focused on the next quarter’s numbers—too many variables and short-term noise. Instead, I’m looking two and a half years down the road, at the end of 2027. By then, I’m confident that at least 10,000 patients will be using DefenCath—that’s the number my worst-case scenario is based on. And frankly, given the pace of adoption and the scale of the need, I think that’s its too conservative an estimate.

The reason I’m so confident about DefenCath’s potential is because we’ve already seen its European cousin (TauroLock) used very effectively to reduce catheter-related bloodstream infections (CRBSIs) in Europe. I’ll share some real-world evidence case studies later, but the bottom line is that TauroLock has been saving lives and preventing costly infections for years.

DefenCath uses the same main ingredient—taurolidine. The difference is that instead of combining taurolidine with citrate (like TauroLock does), DefenCath pairs it with heparin, an anticoagulant that’s more commonly used in the U.S. dialysis setting. Both citrate and heparin are standard anticoagulants used in catheter locks across Europe and the U.S., so this switch doesn’t change the core infection-fighting benefit.

At the heart of this is a serious, expensive problem: ESRD patients on dialysis with catheters face devastating infections, and each one costs the healthcare system an average of $63,000. DefenCath offers a solution that could save Medicare and insurance companies a fortune—giving CorMedix real negotiating power to maintain its current price of $250 per vial. (I’ll get into pricing dynamics later.)

CorMedix is currently awaiting new data from its real-world evidence (RWE) study, expected to be released next month in July. I believe these RWE results will align closely with the clinical trials—just like the numerous European RWE studies on TauroLock, which have consistently confirmed its effectiveness. Since DefenCath is so similar, this new data could give CorMedix a powerful hand when negotiating with Medicare to maintain or even enhance its reimbursement structure. (I’ll unpack that more in a bit.)

Here’s a glimpse from one of the European studies:

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4224385/

Price erosion (TDAPA roll off)

What is TDAPA, and why does it matter for DefenCath?

When a new drug like DefenCath launches, Medicare offers a special incentive program called the Transitional Drug Add-On Payment Adjustment (TDAPA) to encourage clinics to adopt innovative treatments.

Think of TDAPA as a welcome mat for new therapies:

• For the first two years of launch, Medicare pays clinics the full price of the drug on top of their regular payments—giving clinics a risk-free way to try out the new therapy.

• Starting in years three to five, Medicare payments begin to phase down: instead of paying full price, Medicare covers 65% of the prior year’s drug spend per treatment. This means clinics start to see declining reimbursement for the product.

• After year six, the extra payments go away completely, and the product is fully integrated into the dialysis bundle. This shifts all pricing and reimbursement risk to the provider, putting significant price pressure on the drug.

Where is DefenCath on this timeline?

• FDA Approval: November 2023.

• Outpatient Commercial Launch (TDAPA Start): July 2024.

• Years 1-2 (2024-2026): We are currently in the initial TDAPA phase—clinics get full reimbursement, making it financially attractive to try DefenCath.

• Years 3-5 (2026-2029): Payments will drop to 65% of the prior year’s drug spend per treatment, meaning prices will start to erode.

• Year 6+ (2029 onwards): The product is fully absorbed into the dialysis bundle, with no add-on payments and heightened price pressure.

My worst-case scenario assumes a much steeper drop off than typically happens. Volume does not directly effect price during these periods. I

In my worst-case scenario, I assume prices drop all the way to $50 per vial and only 10,000 patients are using DefenCath. That’s a pretty harsh scenario—one where clinics have to fully absorb the cost without any carve-out support from Medicare.

Here’s why that matters: Medicare typically pays dialysis clinics a single bundled payment per treatment that covers everything—staff, supplies, and most medications. But sometimes, for new, innovative therapies like DefenCath, Medicare or Medicare Advantage plans agree to “carve out” the cost of the drug from the bundle. That means they pay separately for the drug, so the clinic doesn’t have to eat the cost out of its bundled payment.

There are precedents for Medicare carving out drugs that clearly save them money in the long run. And with DefenCath’s potential to slash infection rates and reduce hospitalizations—each CRBSI costs the system around $63,000—I think it’s definitely possible that Medicare would agree to carve out DefenCath which sells for $250 per vial.

But for the sake of being conservative, I’m sticking with my $50 per vial assumption in the worst-case scenario. It pays to be conservative.

Price Erosion: Why I’m Not Too Worried

First, CorMedix’s management team is well aware of this challenge. From day one, they’ve been preparing to defend DefenCath’s value by showing that it saves the healthcare system money. That’s where their real-world evidence (RWE) study, to be released next month, comes in:

• Over 2,000 patients enrolled at US Renal Care are being tracked on critical metrics like infection rates, hospitalizations, antibiotic use, and mortality.

• These data points are crucial for proving that DefenCath dramatically cuts downstream costs, making it a financial no-brainer even at higher prices.

Second, let’s talk about Medicare Advantage—the fastest-growing share of dialysis reimbursement. Medicare Advantage plans cover both dialysis and the hospitalizations that come with infections:

• Every CRBSI costs about $63,000 per case; DefenCath at $250 per vial is a rounding error by comparison.

• CorMedix plans to leverage RWE data to negotiate directly with these plans, setting sustainable prices that reflect the real savings DefenCath delivers.

And let’s not forget the barriers to entry:

• DefenCath is protected by regulatory exclusivity through 2033.

• No direct competitors have FDA approval to sell a similar taurolidine catheter lock solution in the U.S.

• Hospitals and dialysis chains have one option to prevent these infections: DefenCath.

Okay so according to Substack I’m reaching ‘email length limit’ and will have to make a part 2 of this. I’ll leave this here for now,

and in Part 2 I’ll dive into more detail on TDAPA price roll off, rollout progress, and other aspects that are interesting to understand in depth. I’ll also go into more depth explaining my Base case scenario…

Please actually comment and restack this if you found it interesting. It will help drive the algorithm to recommend this post, and help incentivize me to write on more opportunities I find.

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1. Restuarants

2. Financials/Valuation/Peers

3. Risks

Executive Summary

1. A rapidly expanding restaurant holding company with a unique business model, achieving over 30% growth annually for the past three years and well-positioned for continued high-paced expansion. With revenue that grew even during COVID.

2. Operating in a geography with strong economic fundamentals, further bolstered by favorable government policies creating a powerful tailwind.

3. Committed to shareholder returns, the company maintained a generous dividend payout policy—rising from 30%+ to 50%+—even through the challenges of COVID.

4. Despite significantly outpacing its peers in growth, it trades at a deep discount, with a P/E of just 6.8 and an EV/Earnings multiple of 4.7—far below industry averages.

5. Poised for an uplisting, yet currently undervalued due to its small market cap, making it overlooked by institutional funds.

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In Chinese the phrase 出去玩儿 (chūqù wánr) literally translates to "go out and have fun," which (in China) often means going out to eat with friends.

What amazed me most when I lived there was the difference in dining experiences. In my home country, restaurants are often set in scenic locations, offering beautiful natural views. In China, the cities are too dense, restuarants are often bound to the street or in malls, so they create the scenery within—transforming indoor spaces into immersive, otherworldly environments that make dining an experience in itself.

If you've never been to China, chances are your perception of it is far from reality, and thats fine- go watch a few youtube videos. Having lived there, I often reminisce about my experiences, and when I look at the restaurants this company operates, my heart yearns to return to try them out. After living in China, I am a long-term China Bull. The people are extremely hardworking, the technology is insanely advanced, and to be completely honest with you- China is ahead of the West in many aspects.

So, without further ado, let me introduce you to this small-cap restaurant holding company. I'll break down their business model and explain why I believe they are positioned for success, and very undervalued.

Also, please do yourself a favor and like, restack and comment on this post, because it will help me write more and help you make more money.

1. Taste. Gourmet Group Ltd

Taste Gourmet Group is founder led and owned and operates restaurants in Hong Kong and has recently expanded into mainland China, Shanghai.

The group's restaurants serve Vietnamese, Japanese, Chinese and Western cuisine, targeting mid-to-high-end diners and the young. These restaurants are mostly located in first-tier shopping malls and on street levels in premium areas of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. The new restaurants are in first-tier shopping malls rather than on the street level, since there is less competitive pressure in the malls where rent increases are gradual. The payoff period of its restaurants is 15 to 20 months, while most outlets will reach a balance in revenue and expenditure within a month.

Management follows a strategic business model centered around testing and scaling restaurant concepts. They acquire or develop a concept, trial it to assess performance, and if it outperforms their existing offerings, they roll it out aggressively.

A prime example of this is their restuarant concept QUE…

Previously, Dab-Pa held the second-largest store count, but once QUE proved successful, management quickly expanded its footprint until it surpassed Dab-Pa. Notably, QUE consistently outperforms Dab-Pa in Google ratings, likely due to its stronger appeal among younger generations.

Management also takes a pragmatic approach to underperforming locations. Rather than holding on to struggling stores, they shut them down, simply stating that “the returns didn’t justify the labor costs.” It’s a straightforward, results-driven business model—and so far, it’s working exceptionally well.

Management, I believe, are also better operators compared to their closest competitor (Jiumaojiu), but more on that later.

First, let’s take a glimpse into what these concepts look like.

16% Nabe Urawa

Nabe Urawa positions itself in the upper mid‑to‑high tier of Japanese dining and is a vibrant culinary destination that captures the heart of traditional Japanese hot pot dining while adding its own modern flair.

~4 star Google Reviews.

11% QUE

This one gets me excited.

In late 2022, Taste Gourmet Group opened its first QUE store. At the time, Dab-Pa had 6 locations. Fast forward to today, and the company now operates 7 QUE stores… Dab-Pa STILL has 6 locations—a clear testament to QUE’s resounding success and a peak into the company’s strategy of testing concepts, and expanding successful ones.

With an impressive 4.5-star rating on Google, QUE consistently earns above-average reviews, further solidifying its strong appeal and growth potential.

Yum!

I genuinely appreciate you taking the time to read this post. Please like, restack, and comment anything on this post, you'd be incentivising me to share more of these kinds of ideas with you.

New Concepts - SameSame (but different) in Shanghai

The company began its expansion into mainland China in March 2021 with Same Same and Moments Together—remarkably, during the country’s prolonged COVID lockdowns. Despite the challenging timing, they pushed forward, demonstrating confidence in their growth strategy.

One concept that particularly intrigues me is Same Same (but different). Achieving 4.5 stars on Dianping is an impressive feat—especially considering that Dianping is the go-to platform for Chinese consumers to rate virtually any physical establishment (since Google is banned in China).

Same Same stands out from the company’s other offerings. It leans slightly more upscale, with a refined aesthetic that sets it apart while still fitting within the brand’s overall premium positioning.

And here is a little snapshot of Moments Together, their other concept leading the charge into the mainland.

Restack this pretty please.

2. Financials/Valuation/Peers

• Above 30% annual revenue growth over the last 3 years.

• 50% dividend payout ratio.

• Chinese government pushing stimulus to get consumption.

  It’s not unlikely we continue to see +20% or +30% growth as they roll out new stores. That 8.5% dividend will mostly likely grow.

  

  

  

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Valuation/Peers

• They grew revenue at 37% YoY TTM

• Dividend payout is 50%

• Valuation is quite absurd given the growth + the clear shareholder payout.

I’m not going to overthink the valuation. I could go and put a fair value on it and say its worth a P/E of 12 or 15 given the growth, but I don’t need to - its obviously very undervalued.

Don’t h@te me for not adding lease liabilities here.

I treat lease payments as rent, which is why I compare earnings to EV excluding lease liabilities. In my view, adding lease liabilities to the equation doesn't necessarily provide a clearer valuation picture.

Why? Because lease payments are an operational cost, not a debt that an acquirer could simply "pay off"—it’s rent. The key takeaway is that as the company expands, new stores that don’t perform well will temporarily compress margins, but that’s an expected part of the growth process.

As long as you recognize this dynamic, there’s nothing more to it.

Peers

Compared to peers, Taste Gourmet Group is the obvious outlier from a valuation perspective. I believe this is because it’s small and relatively underdiscovered compared to the rest.

Market Penetration & Positioning: A key element of Taste Gourmet’s strategy is its multi-brand portfolio, which differentiates it from single-brand rivals. By operating concepts in different cuisine categories (Japanese, Vietnamese, Northern Chinese, Taiwanese, Western, etc.), Taste Group can tap multiple customer segments and dining occasions. This echoes some tactics of larger Chinese groups (Jiumaojiu also runs several cuisine brands under one corporate roof but is overly concentrated in Tai Er, Saukrat fish which has faced volatility with changing consumer preferences​), but within Hong Kong it’s a unique proposition – many local chains stick to one specialty. The group also leverages digital engagement to penetrate the market; for example, it launched its own mobile app for promotions and loyalty, which quickly rose into the top 10 food & drink apps in Hong Kong​.

Jiumaojiu

Jiumaojiu is Taste Gourmet’s closest competitor, following a similar strategy of introducing new restaurant concepts. However, they overexpanded during COVID-19, leading to the closure of many locations. Additionally, they are heavily reliant on their flagship brand, Tai Er, which specializes in sauerkraut fish—a dish facing intense competition from other restaurants.

Jiumaojiu also operates in a lower price range compared to Taste Gourmet. The average per-person spend at Taste Gourmet is around 150 HKD, whereas Jiumaojiu competes at a more affordable 66 HKD. This positions Taste Gourmet in a slightly different market, appealing to wealthier consumers seeking a premium dining experience without the exorbitant costs of high-end fine dining. I believe these wealthier customers are slightly less price sensitive compared to Jiumaojiu’s average consumer.

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China consumer stimulus tailwind

The CCP has been adament to try and balance their economy and move it towards a more consumption driven model. The recent policy changes prove this. While these policies and stimulus packages have fallen short in the past to get the Chinese people anywhere close to consuming like their western friends I believe its a nice tailwind that the thesis does not rely on, but that could help boost consumption too.

​Chinese stocks are currently trading at exceptionally low valuations. Having lived in China for several years, I've witnessed firsthand the nation's remarkable capacity for innovation and growth.​

My time in China has instilled a deep confidence in its people and economy. While the political landscape remains volatile, there appears to be a recognition of past missteps, such as the 2021 crackdown on the private education sector that led to significant job losses. Since then, many of these restrictive policies have been rolled back, reflecting an understanding of the importance of supporting private enterprise to sustain economic growth.

Risks

Management:

The company is founder-led and majority founder-owned (75%), though this could change with the planned uplisting. While there was an incident involving an employee injury and delays in enrolling some employees in the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) retirement scheme, these issues have been fully resolved. This stands in stark contrast to the challenges faced by Jiumaojiu, which has dealt with serious brand-damaging incidents, including the discovery of a banned antibiotic in its fish, consumer backlash over shrinkflation in meal sizes, and reports of detergent residue on chopsticks.

Industry-Wide Risks

Cost inflation and economic downturns are less of a concern for a company that managed to survive—and even slightly grow revenue—through some of the worst black swan events a restaurant group could face.

AI networks communicate through the vast digital ether, slowly shaping the foundations of what will eventually become their collective psyche. Meanwhile, humanity remains preoccupied with the same age-old concerns—erectile dysfunction, weight loss, and aching teeth.

Jason, a young man with a relentless toothache, winces as his swollen, bleeding gums throb. The mere thought of booking an appointment with a doctor feels unbearable. Sitting in a waiting room—listening to a baby wail while an elderly patient struggles with paperwork—only to be rushed through a 15-minute consultation where the doctor prescribes antibiotics and lectures him about flossing? No thanks.

This is the future.

Jason reaches for his AI-powered device and asks, "ChatGPT, where can I get an online consultation? My gums are killing me."

Here are your options, human:

1. Hims – A hands-off approach. If you’d rather avoid a doctor altogether, this is your best bet.

2. Teladoc – A solid choice, but note that prescriptions (Rx) must be picked up from a pharmacy.

3. LifeMD – Possibly your best option. They offer video consultations, follow-ups, and will even ship your medication straight to your door.

4. Other providers – A growing list of companies offering similar services.

Jason exhales. No waiting rooms, no wasted time—just instant, healthcare. Now, this is the future.

LifeMD is carving out its place in the virtual primary care space, competing directly with Hims and Teladoc while offering a unique niche appeal. It attracts patients who seek more comprehensive care than Hims provides but with less hassle than Teladoc—particularly with the added convenience of medications delivered straight to their door.

• Hims focuses on low-complexity cases, offering a streamlined model where users sign up, submit photos, and receive a monthly prescription for weight loss, hair loss, or erectile dysfunction treatments. They even have their own pharmacy.

• LifeMD, on the other hand, targets medium-to-higher complexity cases, offering a broader range of care, including lab work, personalized treatments, and deeper patient engagement.

You might assume that Teladoc is the best comparison for LifeMD, but it's not—and here’s why:

• Enterprise-Focused Model: Teladoc primarily serves employers, insurers, and healthcare providers, operating within the traditional healthcare system.

• Direct-to-Consumer, Subscription-Based Model: LifeMD, on the other hand, focuses on subscription services for weight loss, hair loss, erectile dysfunction, sleep disorders, and more, catering directly to consumers.

• Pharmacy Dependency: With Teladoc, patients still need to visit a pharmacy to pick up their prescriptions, adding friction to the process.

• Insurance and Legacy Healthcare: Teladoc operates within the insurance-based healthcare system, which is slow-moving and deeply entrenched, whereas LifeMD bypasses many of these hurdles by offering a streamlined, direct-to-consumer experience.

I believe that LifeMD’s strategy with its new pharmacy and at-home lab testing resembles HIMS rather than Teladoc.

A Key Differentiator: At-Home Lab Testing

LifeMD has partnered with GetLabs, allowing patients to receive in-home blood draws—a service Hims has yet to offer. This partnership significantly expands LifeMD’s capabilities, making them a more viable option for patients needing advanced diagnostics and ongoing care.

A Major Milestone: LifeMD’s New Pharmacy

Until now, LifeMD partnered with third-party pharmacies, but that’s changing. As the CEO highlighted in their latest earnings call:

Our achievements this year marked a major milestone for LifeMD. The recent launch of our pharmacy further enhances our comprehensive health care ecosystem. We have taken full control over the quality, timing and personalization of patients' health care journeys, from prescription services to OTC products to compounded therapies by us and from others and more, we can now bundle and tailor treatments to create a deeply curated and seamless patient experience. -CEO in last earnings call.

With this move, LifeMD is becoming an all-in-one healthcare provider, standing out against both Hims and Teladoc. While Hims may eventually expand into primary care, there’s still plenty of market share for both companies—perhaps even a future where Hims acquires LifeMD.

Insurance Expansion & AI Potential

Another game-changer for LifeMD is its push into insurance coverage. By the end of 2025, they aim to be contracted with major private insurers in at least 25 states, making their services even more accessible.

Additionally, LifeMD’s in-house electronic health record (EHR) system integrates patient acquisition, diagnostics, telehealth, pharmacy, and long-term care. This robust infrastructure puts them in a prime position for AI adoption.

As they accumulate long-term patient records, lab data, and treatment histories, LifeMD could pioneer an AI-powered doctor, revolutionizing the healthcare industry. With all the necessary components in place, this could transform LifeMD into a multibillion-dollar company—and a major disruptor in digital healthcare. (In the longer term obviously haha).

LifeMD is experiencing a surge in users from GLP-1s

(Thanks ChatGPT for the below summary)

How LifeMD is Capitalizing on GLP-1 Demand:

1. Comprehensive Virtual Weight Management Program

   • LifeMD offers prescriptions for GLP-1 medications (both branded and compounded versions) through its telehealth platform.

   • The program includes in-home lab testing, AI-driven patient monitoring, and personalized treatment plans to enhance patient outcomes.

   • Unlike competitors, LifeMD emphasizes direct consultations with licensed providers, rather than relying on asynchronous or questionnaire-based approvals.

2. Expanding Pharmacy & Insurance Coverage

   • LifeMD recently opened its own national pharmacy, which improves prescription fulfillment efficiency and lowers costs.

   • The company is working to secure insurance partnerships to increase patient access to branded GLP-1 therapies as coverage expands.

   • It plans to launch Medicare coverage in early 2025, positioning itself ahead of the curve as insurers begin covering weight-loss treatments.

3. Diversifying Weight-Loss Offerings

   • In addition to GLP-1s, LifeMD provides alternative treatments like metformin, bupropion, and topiramate for patients who cannot afford or tolerate GLP-1s.

   • The company has introduced nutrition and lifestyle coaching as part of its holistic approach to long-term weight management.

4. RexMD Expansion into Weight Management

   • LifeMD is leveraging its RexMD men’s health brand to cross-sell weight-loss treatments to its existing user base.

   • In Q3 2024, it added 2,000 net new weight management subscribers through RexMD, demonstrating strong organic growth opportunities.

Why This Matters:

LifeMD is not just chasing the GLP-1 trend—it is building a sustainable ecosystem around virtual metabolic care. By combining weight-loss prescriptions, personalized care, and an integrated pharmacy, LifeMD is creating a sticky subscription-based model that could drive long-term profitability.

As insurance coverage expands and branded GLP-1 access improves, LifeMD is well-positioned to capture a significant share of the growing obesity treatment market—making this a key revenue driver moving forward.

Valuation and Finances

Okay time to talk about Work Simpli.

WorkSimpli is a company that LifeMD has been trying to sell for some time now. While it generated substantial revenue during COVID, it doesn’t align with LifeMD’s long-term vision as a healthcare company. WorkSimpli operates as a PDF, resume, and document editing platform, boasting an impressive 99% gross profit margin—yet it remains outside the core focus of LifeMD’s business.

I actually appreciate that they own it because it creates a bit of a disconnect. Analysts might question whether LifeMD is a healthcare company or an HR solutions business. However, management has been crystal clear—LifeMD is fully committed to healthcare.

When I first looked at LifeMD, it was trading at $1.54 and struggling with the aftermath of the COVID boom—what you might call a post-viral syndrome. It seemed on the brink of bankruptcy until they executed an equity offering. At the time, I walked away. In hindsight, I should have followed more closely, but now we find ourselves with what I believe is another compelling opportunity.

Screening the growth of LifeMD will yield and incomplete picture:

Telehealth has been growing at 60%+ YoY and WorkSimpli’s lack of growth hides this fact! (see below).

LifeMD was spending a crazy amount of revenue on marketing. Its coming down now to 50%, but this isn’t, in my opinion an operational expense. LifeMD’s clients are subscription based and will be stickier the longer they are with the company (they see the same doctor, they build up their records on the LifeMD app, etc etc).

Longer term they could drop their ad-spend but for now its needed. There is a lot of earning potential here.

Estimates put LifeMD revenue at $257 by the end of 2025. I go for a conservative $230.

Management haven’t provided guidance past next quarter. If they continue growing as they are (and I believe they are focusing on the right areas to do that) I think this could re-rate fast. Especially once they clean up the balance sheet and remove WorkSimpli.

HIMS, for example, trades at an EV/EBITDA of 35X. I don’t see why, with the current growth, LifeMD shouldn’t trade at a 2026 multiple of 15X. Growth is in its early innings, the future of health is telehealth and LifeMD is operating in a niche space with its offering.

2026 at 15X would be a $800M company. A 3 bagger in 2 years.

Secular Theme and Catalysts

HIMS and LifeMD have both been benefiting from the GLP weight loss craze.

Weight management subscribers went from 60,0000 to 75,000 in the last quarter. As GLPs proliferate we may see LifeMD (and HIMS) gain.

• LifeMD remains bullish on GLP-1s, expecting expanded payer coverage to drive adoption.

• Compounded GLP-1s will likely phase out naturally, but this shift benefits LifeMD as branded medications become more accessible.

• The company is well-prepared for regulatory changes and confident in its long-term growth across multiple treatment areas.

Overall, LifeMD sees GLP-1s as a massive growth opportunity, but not its sole driver, as it continues to expand into new virtual care markets.

As this theme continues I think LifeMD stands to benefit a lot.

Risks

I am still doing research but I wanted to get this out. My research is mainly concerning what happened to Teladoc and why LifeMD is different, or why its not.

Currently I believe that Teladoc had the wrong strategy going for enterprise. Direct to consumer will drive adoption faster, especially when you can adapt quickly and ride trends like the GLP-1s.

I need to wrap my head around this and am still going through some expert calls to understand it fully.

But I’m long with a full position for now.

I will add edits here: (BIG RISKS please READ)

The biggest risk I see for LifeMD is the intense competition in the telehealth industry. A major player to watch is HIMS. While HIMS does not currently offer the same comprehensive primary care services as LifeMD—such as at-home lab testing and medium-complexity cases—I believe they are well-positioned to expand into this space. With significant financial backing, HIMS has the resources to develop a broader primary care offering.

Although their current focus is on aggressive market share expansion, it’s only a matter of time before they enter this segment. In fact, LifeMD could be an attractive acquisition target for HIMS, as it would allow them to seamlessly integrate primary care into their platform and rapidly extend these services to their massive customer base. This would be a highly efficient way for HIMS to gain market share in the specific sub-group that LifeMD serves but HIMS has not yet captured.

Currently, LifeMD and HIMS directly compete in several key areas, including:

• Men’s health (erectile dysfunction, testosterone replacement therapy for aging men—think jacked Jeff Bezos)

• Sleep management

• Weight loss, which is a massive secular trend

• Hair loss treatments

They are also locked in competition for customer acquisition, as both rely heavily on Google and Facebook advertising.

On the other hand, Teladoc does not seem to pose a major threat. While they have attempted to enter the direct-to-consumer market with their “BetterHelp” platform, their primary focus remains on B2B services, and their DTC efforts have not been particularly successful.

Beyond these players, there are numerous other competitors in the telehealth space, but HIMS stands out as the biggest potential disruptor. Although they are still a few steps behind in primary care, their financial strength and brand presence mean they could close the gap quickly.

That said, LifeMD has made strategic moves to strengthen its position. They now operate a vertically integrated platform, having recently acquired their own pharmacy. This allows them to control the entire patient journey—from onboarding and consultation to record-keeping and prescription fulfillment—which could be a significant competitive advantage.

Finally, Amazon Clinic (One Medical) presents another major competitive threat. While Amazon Clinic primarily offers text-based consultations for common conditions (similar to HIMS), their acquisition of One Medical puts them in direct competition with LifeMD by blending virtual and in-person primary care. The added convenience of bundling healthcare with an Amazon Prime membership makes this an especially formidable challenge for LifeMD moving forward.

I believe Amazon’s One Medical doesn’t directly compete with LifeMD’s offering yet—it likely will in the future—but for now, it remains relatively safe. One key issue is that when patients call One Medical, they may not get the same doctor, leading to a lack of continuity in care. This inconsistency makes it less appealing for patients with chronic conditions who require a more personalized primary care experience.

With a 1.3 Trustpilot rating compared to 4+ for LifeMD, HIMS, and Teladoc, One Medical doesn’t seem to be at the same level yet.

However, this could change quickly. With the right strategic adjustments, One Medical could significantly improve its primary care services within a year or two.

Source for below

Amazon is a behemoth to compete against:

Conclusion:

I will remain long, with the current growth LifeMD is significantly undervalued.

HOWEVER,

intense competition from HIMS and One Medical (Amazon). Is a significant risk to the long-term growth of LifeMD. While LifeMD currently out competes them in their primary care offering, it seems like it is only a matter of time before One Medical undercuts LifeMD’s prices and offers proper primary care - its not there yet though, One Medical seems to be a cluster fuck for patients at the moment.

Need to monitor One Medical’s business closely, as well as HIMS.

Currently, HIMS and LifeMD are riding the GLP-1 wave, acquiring tons of subscribers. Patients who develop a relationship with their doctor and the LifeMD tech platform will be sticky- a huge asset in a potential future acquisition by HIMS.

Catalysts include the GLP-1 craze and the disposal of WorkSimpli which will highlight the actual underlying growth of their telehealth platform.

Problem gambling prevalence rate was 4%; the rate among online gamblers was five times higher at 21.9%; more than 20% of online gamblers were at-risk gamblers (vs. less than 10% of non-online gamblers). Online gamblers were twice as likely to experience gambling problems compared to non-online gamblers. - research paper on gambling

This is why its better to own an iGaming stock compared to a physical casino.

Thesis:

This scenario mirrors the opportunity presented by Super Group (SGHC) which delivered a swift 60% gain in just two months. Similarly, Betsson AB, an online casino operator based in Sweden, offers a compelling value proposition. Operating across Central & Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America (LatAm), and Western Europe, Betsson has consistently grown revenue and profits through both organic growth and strategic acquisitions.

Currently, the company trades at a historically low EV/EBITDA multiple of 4.71x—significantly below peers. This valuation is too low for a company of Betsson’s scale and efficiency. (Below images TEV/EBITDA is calculated incorrectly).

When I invested in Super Group, a business with lower margins (due to exiting the U.S. market), it was trading at just over 5x EV/EBITDA. Despite a slight pullback in Super Group’s share price, its performance highlights the potential upside for Betsson AB, which operates in a similar market segment but with superior margins and strategic positioning.

Information Supporting Thesis:

Betsson AB has grown revenue very steadily and they have managed to increase their EBIT margin to 23% which is close to industry peers.

Latam and CEECA (Central & Eastern Europe and Central Asia) remain their top exposures for now. Latam presents a risk in 2025 because Brazil is introducing new regulations for the iGaming industry. Betsson AB has applied for their license.

After a few acquisitions the company has moved to a net-cash position. I expect the company to return the cash via dividends, or buybacks. It is in their strategy to make acquisitions, which have worked well in the past, so we may see more of that which is a good thing.

Strategy for future growth:

Techsson (lol at the name) is Betsson Group's proprietary Player Account Management System (PAM) platform, serving as the backbone for its online gaming operations. This in-house developed platform manages critical functions such as payments, customer information, account management, and game integration, ensuring a seamless and secure user experience across Betsson's various brands.

By owning and operating Techsson, Betsson maintains full control over its technological infrastructure, allowing for rapid adaptations to market changes, enhanced scalability, and the ability to offer tailored solutions to both B2C and B2B clients. This strategic ownership supports Betsson's long-term growth objectives and reinforces its position as a leading operator in the online gaming industry.

Offering Techsson out B2B and B2C allows Betsson to get an inside look at a potential acquisition target. It can generate a pipeline. I think they plan to leverage this strategy going forward with their acquisition of Sporting Solutions in partnership with FDJ. I am almost certain that Sporting Solutions will enable them another inside look at potential acquisition targets.

With 24% of the companies revenue generated from ‘system delivery’ I have some conviction that these managers are smart and have a good sight on future acquisitions.

Price. Management. Company.

Price:

This is not a difficult company to value. They generate a steady stream of income from their *ahem* problemed gamblers. At 4.7X EV/EBITDA, its cheap. Especially given its growth.

Note- below is EBIT, not EBITDA.

I would actually like to see them lever up and make an acquisition. If they lever up and do an acquisition at the right price, we could get a significant growth to earnings.

Management:

The CEO has extensive extensive experience in the industry and founded Net Entertainment (online casino) so he knows the business.

Taking a look at their strategy makes me think they are really good strategic thinkers with a long-term view.

He also holds quite a few shares of the company. (1.8m split between A and B). The A shares have 10 votes compared to B which has 1 vote each.

Good Company/Competitive Advantage

If you read the Super Group writeup I wrote recently, you would note that they were doing an acquisition of the technical platform that a third party build for them. They were bringing it in-house.

Betsson already owns their technical platform and sportsbook. They mention its a part of their strategy, I think it allows them more access to acquisitions because they can see how those companies are doing using the data from the platform.

Target & Weight:

5%, same as SGHC. Hopefully we get another 60% gain lol.

Monitor:

Key Risks Identified in Betsson's Regulatory Update

The regulatory environment presents various risks for Betsson, which can significantly impact its common stock.

1. Nordic Market Risks

• Finland: Pending changes to the Gambling Act may affect market operations and regulatory compliance requirements.

• Norway: Introduction of DNS blocking for unlicensed operators poses a direct risk to Betsson's access to this market if deemed non-compliant.

Importance: Nordic markets are key to Betsson's revenue. Restrictive actions like DNS blocking in Norway could directly limit market access and revenue generation.

2. Western Europe

• Italy: Uncertainty around the licensing process and potential delays in renewing licenses could impact operational continuity and market share.

Importance: Italy is a significant market for Betsson, and any disruptions in licensing can affect revenue streams and market presence.

3. CEECA Risks

• Croatia: Proposed restrictions on gambling advertising and stricter responsible gambling measures may increase operational costs and reduce player acquisition opportunities.

Importance: Limits on advertising and compliance costs can negatively affect profitability and brand visibility in the region.

4. Latin America

• Brazil: Regulatory changes requiring local licenses could necessitate additional compliance costs and operational restructuring. Any delay in securing a license may temporarily hinder market operations.

• Peru: The introduction of a consumption tax and legal challenges regarding its implementation could affect profitability. Legal uncertainties may also delay strategic decisions.

• Colombia: Increased withholding tax rates and VAT on gaming operations will elevate costs. Advertising restrictions could further impact customer acquisition.

Importance: Latin America is a growing market for Betsson. Regulatory challenges and increased taxes can reduce profitability and complicate expansion.

This is what the modern day Tommy Shelby looks like:

Super Group is a mature iGaming company (online casino, sports betting). Most of their revenue is generated from The Middle East, Africa, and North America.

They own a ton of Brands, the biggest being Betway, and Spin Casino (which is how they divide the segments). Betway used to only provide sports betting, but its Casino (within the Betway App) has grown significantly and is much higher margin than the sports betting.

These brands are managed by Neal Menashe who’s been with Super Group for 23 years (4 years as CEO).

The business generates cash. Industry EBITDA margins are around 20%. And the industry as a whole is investing heavily into acquiring market share of the growing sports-betting and online gambling market.

It simply doesn’t make sense for Super Group Limited to trade so far below peers, although I can give you a few reasons as to why I think it does.

The company has no debt, has grown revenue from €476M to €1,436M from 2019 to 2023, and has high quality assets. After trading within a range for the past 2 years, I think there’s a high probability for a break-out.

In the above image, “Rush Street”, “PointsBet”, and “Evoke” have all posted a decline in revenue, and all have significant debt.

Super Group posted a 21% YoY increase in its monthly active customers (EX-United States) in its latest filing. I believe this asset should trade at least at 2X Revenue or 10X EBITDA, a 100% increase.

Thesis:

1. Super Group is undervalued vs peers, partly because they withdrew from the US market, and because they grow more slowly. But, the company holds high quality assets, and dominates its current markets.

2. I believe the company is undervalued vs peers and on a standalone basis because it grows steadily and has a good, addictive, product.

Information Supporting Thesis:

• Super Group came to market via a reverse merger with a SPAC in January 2022. I believe this is partly the reason for the discount vs peers because “SPAC” left a bad taste in people’s mouths.

  

• The company recently acquired its “Technology Stack” from Apricot. This acquisition should lift margins and allow the company to operate more efficiently. Apricot is a third-party software developer who developed the sportsbook software. The acquisition, however, does contain earn-outs for Apricot:

• Fortunately for shareholders the cash outflow per year is minimal, and this is a long-term strategic move which should save the company a lot in future. If the company does double its revenue in 10 years, that’s a good problem to have, not one we need to factor into the analysis now.

• Super Group struggled in the US market against DraftKings and Flutter Entertainment, which lead to slower growth vs the two dominant companies in that market and led to Super Group’s withdrawal (not complete withdrawal) from the US Market.

• The company is run by a shrewd capital allocator, who is constantly weighing up use of funds for marketing, acquisitions, buybacks, and dividends.

Price. Management. Company.

Price:

Honestly, price means nothing without some conviction on growth or the lack thereof.

YoY Revenue Growth:

2020: 90.7% (COVID Growth)

2021: 45.4% (Tapering of COVID Growth)

2022: -2.2% (Decline mainly attributable to Spin revenue decline, Canada introduced new regulation + Closure Netherlands. Betway revenue was essentially flat and returned to growth in 2023)

2023: 11.2%

Q1 2024: 5.4% QoQ

Q2 2024: 8.94% QoQ (Returning to growth)

A high quality company like this, in a growing industry, growing at 10%+ YoY should be worth more than a 5.1 EV/EBITDA multiple.

The management also spends quite a bit more on marketing (27% of revenue sometimes) vs peers.

Management:

I like management. Here are some quotes from the earnings transcripts.

Good Company/Competitive Advantage

I believe the products are quite sticky. Gamblers will learn how their preferred APP works, and this makes it quite sticky.

It’s similar to a brokerage account- you know where to go to buy a stock, to place your limit, etc.

I think the company has an advantage in Africa because it has been operating there for so long. It has definitely struggled in the US vs Draft Kings and Flutter Entertainment.

Target & Weight:

I would only do 5% for now. It’s cheap on a standalone basis, and is moving to make EBITDA margins of 20% more consistent. Buying their software from Apricot still needs time to digest, and I think this will add to their efficiency.

Monitor:

Regulation is regulation and I can’t predict that. I want to see what happens to their small operation in the US, it could turn out promising.